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I. INTRODUCTION
The Chief Seattle Days festival is held each summer in the
state of Washington on the Suquamish Indian Reservation.
This festival offers the opportunity for American Indians of
different tribes to gather together and to discuss and celebrate
their unique histories and traditions. Of course, at any such
sizable gathering, order does not always prevail. Indeed, some
of the participants will likely commit misdemeanor criminal
offenses such as assault and battery, trespassing, and public
intoxication. After the tribal police have made their arrests,
the accused Indians who are not members of the Suquamish
tribe will have their day in court, or will they?'
This question is raised by the recent United States
Supreme Court decision of Duro v. Reina.2 In Duro, the Court
held that tribes do not have jurisdiction over minor, or misde-
meanor, crimes committed on reservation by nonmember Indi-
ans.3  Because tribal courts have no jurisdiction over
nonmembers under the Duro decision, the question thus
becomes one of who has jurisdiction over crimes committed by
nonmember Indians. Under the Federal Enclaves Act, the fed-
eral government does not have jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted by "one Indian against the person or property of
* B.A. 1989, University of Colorado; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Puget
Sound School of Law.
1. Although Washington adopted Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)) [hereinafter
Public Law 280], and thus gained jurisdiction over crimes occurring on Indian
reservations, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 37.12.010-.030 (1989), the Washington Governor
retroceded jurisdiction of the Suquamish Reservation back to the United States. See
infra note 163. Therefore, the state has no jurisdiction over crimes other than non-
Indian against non-Indian crimes committed on this reservation. For a discussion of
Public Law 280, see info notes 18 and 19.
2. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
3. Id at 2061.
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another Indian ... .", Furthermore, barring the adoption of
Public Law 280,1 the state courts have no jurisdiction over any
crimes whatsoever committed by Indians against Indians in
Indian country.6 Thus, the decision in Duro needlessly creates
a jurisdictional gap over nonmember Indians committing
minor crimes against other Indians on reservation land and
leaves open the very real possibility that neither the federal
nor the state governments will move in to fill that gap. A non-
member offender at the Washington festival would simply
walk away.
To understand how this jurisdictional gap over nonmem-
ber Indians needlessly came about and why neither the federal
government nor the state governments will step in to exercise
jurisdiction, this Note (1) looks at the complex web of law on
criminal jurisdiction over Indians; (2) examines the Court's
reasoning in Duro that culminated in the conclusion that tribal
courts have no jurisdiction over nonmember Indians commit-
ting minor crimes on reservation; (3) identifies the analytical
errors made by the Court in Duro; and (4) examines the future
of jurisdiction over this class of criminal offenders.
II. CRIMINAL JURISDICrION OVER INDIANS
Before truly grasping the complexities of jurisdiction over
crimes committed on tribal land, one must first have some
sense of the status of the tribes themselves. Whatever may
have been the case for the tribes prior to the European "dis-
covery" of America, the arrival of the Europeans drastically
altered tribal status. The European doctrine of "discovery"
gave the discovering government the sole right to establish
relations between itself and the discovered country's indige-
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
5. See inra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. "Indian country," as used in the
criminal law context, means:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the lists of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). For an excellent discussion of the geographic bounds of Indian
tribalism, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 89-93
(1987).
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nous people.7 As the Supreme Court wrote, "[i]n the establish-
ment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants
were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were, necessar-
ily, to a considerable extent, impaired."' The Indians' rights
were "impaired" in the sense that "discovery" rendered the
tribes no longer "sovereigns" in the full sense of the word.'
Rather, the tribes became "domestic dependent nations."'1
The tribes retained only those powers that were not limited by
treaty or congressional statute or that were not inconsistent
with the tribes' status as domestic dependent nations.1 ' Crimi-
nal jurisdiction over crimes committed on reservation revolves
around precisely which powers the tribes have lost and which
powers they have retained.
Keeping in mind the unique status of the tribes as nations
within a nation, one can construct a framework of criminal
jurisdiction as currently exercised by the federal, state, and tri-
bal governments. This jurisdictional framework is best under-
stood by examining several factors. When crimes are
committed on reservation land, jurisdictional power over these
crimes shifts according to (1) whether the act was a "major"
crime or a crime "other" than a major crime; (2) whether a
non-Indian, a member Indian, or a nonmember Indian commit-
ted the act; and (3) whether the transgression was against an
7. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823), the Court held that
the tribes had the power to grant lands only to the federal government and to no one
else.
8. Id. at 574.
9. "The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights . . . with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power.... ." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
Indian law commentators have long debated the definition of the term
"sovereignty" in regard to the Indian tribes. For an examination of the differing views
of sovereignty, see Bradley B. Furber, Two Promises, Two Propositions. The Wheeler-
Howard Act as a Reconciliation of the Indian Law Civil War, 14 U. PuGET SouND L.
REv. 211, 218-31 (1991).
10. The tribes were first characterized as "domestic dependent nations" in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), where the Court held that,
although a "state," the Cherokee Nation could not be considered a "foreign state"
within Article III of the Constitution. Although the Court has not clearly defined the
term "domestic dependent nation," the Court did shed some light upon the term in
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Here, the Court explained that the
tribes "are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States; dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights ...
From their very weakness and helplessness... there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power." Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
11. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
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Indian or a non-Indian. For clarity, federal, state, and tribal
jurisdiction are explained in turn.
A. Federal Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on reserva-
tion12 falls into the categories of "major" and "other" than
major crimes. Under the Major Crimes Act, certain enumer-
ated major crimes committed on reservation by Indians against
either Indians or non-Indians fall under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts.'3 Under the Federal Enclaves Act,
any crime committed on reservation by non-Indians against
Indians and any crime committed on reservation by Indians
against non-Indians also fall under the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts.'4 Notably, the Enclaves Act exempts Indian
against Indian crime from federal jurisdiction.'"
In summary, the federal courts effectively have jurisdic-
tion over major crimes committed on reservation by Indians
against either Indian or non-Indian, over any crime committed
12. Crimes committed by Indians off reservation fall under either federal or state
jurisdiction depending upon whether the offender violated a federal or state statute.
13. "[Mlurder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony [committed] under
chapter 109A [sexual crimes], incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 [larceny and theft crimes]" are the crimes that
are subject to the laws of the federal government or of the state government if no
federal law is in force. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
Prior to the passage of this statute in 1885, the federal courts exercised no
jurisdiction whatsoever over Indian against Indian crimes. See infra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text. Congress passed the statute because it disapproved of the tribe's
handling of Er Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 339 (1982). The result of Crow Dog was that the tribal court had
sole jurisdiction over the murder of one Indian committed by another Indian in Indian
Country. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 556.
Note that the states, not the federal government, exercise jurisdiction over major
crimes where Public Law 280 has been adopted. See infra note 19 and accompanying
text.
14. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
15. Id.
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by non-Indians against Indians, and over any crime committed
by Indians against non-Indians.
B. State Jurisdiction
Despite the pervasiveness of federal jurisdiction over
crimes committed on reservation, the states also enter the pic-
ture of jurisdiction over these crimes. Presently, the state
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed on
reservation by non-Indians against non-Indians. 6 Additionally,
some states exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on res-
ervation under Public Law 280.'" Where Public Law 280 has
been adopted or mandated, the state obtains jurisdiction over
all crimes committed on reservation whether by or against
Indian or non-Indian.' s Congress enacted this law in 1953, at
16. In United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1881), the Supreme Court
held that, in the absence of a treaty provision to the contrary, Colorado acquired
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes in Indian territory when Colorado
was admitted to the Union as a Territory. The Court bolstered this decision in Draper
v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), when it held that the state courts had jurisdiction
when the enabling act admitting the state to the Union did not exclude state
jurisdiction over crimes committed on reservation by non-Indians or against non-
Indians. The state courts also exercise jurisdiction over victimless crimes committed
on reservation by non-Indians. The McBratney and Draper decisions mandate this
result.
Prior to these decisions, Justice Marshall wrote that "the laws of Georgia can have
no force" on Cherokee nation land. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561
(1832). The inconsistency between the later opinions and Marshall's opinion is
probably best explained by the allotment and assimilation movement that was building
in the late 1800s. This movement sought to break apart the reservations and blend the
Indians into mainstream American culture. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying
text.
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988) allows for state assumption of criminal jurisdiction, and
25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1988) allows for state assumption of civil jurisdiction. Under 25
U.S.C. § 1321(a) the states may obtain jurisdiction only "with the consent of the Indian
tribe occupying the particular part of Indian country or part thereof which could be
affected by such assumption .. " The wording of 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) is substantially
similar. Note that this consent provision was not part of Public Law 280 as originally
adopted by Congress but rather a 1968 amendment to the Act. 82 Stat. 78, 79, §§ 401,
402 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a) (1968)).
Under the above provisions, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington have totally or partially assumed
jurisdiction over tribal lands. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
362 n.125 (1982).
1867 Stat. 588, ch. 505 (1953) (codified at U.S.C. § 1162 (1988)), enacted in 1953,
mandates the assumption of state jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
For an explanation of the retrocession of Public Law 280 jurisdiction, see infra
note 164.
18. Neither the Major Crimes Act nor the Federal Enclaves Act applies to crimes
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least in part, as a means of erasing the distinctions between
Indians and other "citizens." 19
In summary, barring the adoption of Public Law 280, the
states have jurisdiction over all crimes committed on reserva-
tion by non-Indians against non-Indians. A state adopting Pub-
lic Law 280 has jurisdiction over all crimes committed by or
against Indians or non-Indians on reservation land.
C. Tribal Jurisdiction
After sorting out the scope of federal and state jurisdiction
over crimes committed on reservation, the issue remains con-
cerning the reach of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed
on reservation. By federal statute, the maximum sentence the
tribal courts can impose for any one tribal offense is limited to
a $5,000 fine, a jail term of one year, or both.' Thus, the tribal
courts can impose punishment only upon misdemeanor or
minor crimes committed on reservation.
To determine against whom the tribal courts can impose
these punishments, one must examine the seminal decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe."' In Oliphant, two non-
Indians were charged by tribal authorities with minor tribal
crimes.' The United States Supreme Court held that the tri-
bal courts did not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by
non-Indians on reservation land.' In so holding, the Court
explained that, even ignoring the lack of congressional authori-
zation for tribal jurisdiction and ignoring the lack of tribal
jurisdiction language in the relevant treaty, the exercise of tri-
bal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with the
tribes' status as nations dependent upon the United States.'
committed on reservations where Public Law 280 has been mandated, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162(c) (1988), or adopted, 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1988).
19. In considering this law, the Senate adopted a House resolution that called for
legislation "having as its purpose repeal of existing statutory provisions which set
Indians apart from other citizens .... 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2411, codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
20. No tribe shall "impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and [sic] a fine of $5,000,
or both." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988).
21. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
22. Mark Oliphant was charged with assaulting a tribal officer while Daniel
Belgarde was charged with both recklessly endangering another person and injuring
tribal property. I& at 194.
23. Id. at 208.
24. Id. The Court reasoned that the tribes' status was inconsistent with the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians because the federal government
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Thus, the Court set the standard that the tribes retain only
that power which is consistent with that dependent status.2
Because the tribal assertion of power over non-Indians is
inconsistent with that status, the tribes do not share concur-
rent jurisdiction with the federal government over minor
crimes committed by non-Indians on reservation.
The standard set out in Oliphant appeared once again in
the context of jurisdiction over minor crimes committed on
reservation by tribal members in United States v. Wheeler.a
In Wheeler, a Navajo Tribe member was arrested by the tribal
police on the Navajo reservation in Many Farms, Arizona, for
disorderly conduct.' The defendant pled guilty to disorderly
conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A fed-
eral court later sought to prosecute the defendant for statutory
rape.' In holding that both the tribe and the federal court
could prosecute for crimes arising out of the same incident, the
court explained that the tribes undisputedly have the power to
enforce tribal criminal laws against their own members.'
Therefore, the tribes exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
some minor crimes committed on reservation by their own
members.' However, by speaking of tribal power solely over
members, the court in Wheeler set out the possibility that the
tribal courts did not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians.
III. DuRo v. REINA
The Supreme Court's language in Wheeler concerning
possessed the power to protect and to punish its citizens, and thus, by submitting to the
federal government, the tribes could not exact any greater criminal punishment upon
non-Indian citizens than that acceptable to Congress. Id. at 210.
25. "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising ... those powers 'inconsistent
with their status."' Id. at 208.
26. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
27. Id. at 314-15.
28. Id.
29. The Court reasoned that, despite their existence within the borders of the
United States, the tribes "remain 'a separate people with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations."' I& at 322 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 381-82 (1885)).
30. The tribes exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over
crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians because the Federal Enclaves Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988), allows for federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indiansagainst non-Indians. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Of course, the tribes
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1988).
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member Indians remained untested until Duro v. Reina.s1 In
this case, Albert Duro, a member of the Torres-Martinez Band
of Cahuilla Mission Indians, allegedly shot and killed a boy,
who was a member of another tribe, on the Salt River Indian
Reservation in Arizona.' This reservation was home to the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indians.'
The federal government charged Duro with murder and
with aiding and abetting murder under the Major Crimes Act
and the Federal Enclaves Act.' The United States Attorney
dismissed both of these charges, and the Pima-Maricopa tribe
then charged Duro with the illegal firing of a weapon on the
reservation. 5
After the tribal court denied Duro's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, Duro filed a petition for habeas corpus in a
federal district court.' The district court granted the writ, and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded.37
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.'
The Supreme Court began its discussion by explaining that
the decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler set the framework for
the Court's analysis of the current matter. 9 The Court lik-
ened the Duro case to Oliphant by explaining that, as in Oli-
phant, no issue existed as to the explicit divestiture of tribal
power through congressional authorization, treaty provision, or
legislation.' Rather, the Court explained, the issue was
whether the tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-
members was inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status,
and thus, whether the tribes were implicitly divested of crimi-
31. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
32. 1d4 at 2057. Duro lived most of his life in California, outside of any Indian
reservation. Id. His tribe, the Mission tribe, is located in California.
33. Id. at 2056.
34. Id. at 2057.
35. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2057-58 (1990).
36. Id. at 2058.
37. I&; see also Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053
(1990).
38. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059. In Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988),
the Eighth Circuit held that the tribes did not possess inherent criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians; in Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S.
Ct. 2053 (1990), the Ninth Circuit held that the tribes did possess inherent criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
39. Duro, 110 S. Ct. 2059.
40. The Court noted, "the tribal officials do not claim jurisdiction under an
affirmative congressional authorization or treaty provision, and petitioner does not
contend that Congress has legislated to remove jurisdiction from the tribe." rd.
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nal jurisdiction over nonmembers.4 '
The Court then explained that the tribes were no longer
possessed of the full attributes of sovereigns, but rather, the
tribes possessed a limited degree of sovereignty.' This
retained sovereignty, as the Court interpreted the language in
Wheeler," "is that needed to control [the tribes'] own internal
relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social
order."'44 The Court in Duro reasoned that this rule of internal
relations indicated that any tribal attempt at controlling exter-
nal relations, without delegation by Congress, would be incon-
sistent with the tribes' status as dependent nations and thus
invalid.' The Court's reasoning implies that because tribal
control over members is internal and control over nonmem-
bers is external, the former is within the tribes' power whereas
the latter is not.
After framing the theory that only member relations were
consistent with the tribes' status as dependent nations, the
Court explained that other areas of the law recognized the dis-
tinction between members and nonmembers and the distinc-
tion's relation to self-governance. 46 The Court stated first that
in state taxation matters, nonmembers stand on a footing more
similar to non-Indians than member Indians.47 Further, the
Court asserted, the tribes cannot regulate hunting and fishing
on land held in fee by nonmembers within the boundaries of
the reservation.4 Thus, with the state taxation and hunting
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2060.
43. Although the Duro Court cited no specific passage, the Court presumably
referred to the Wheeler language that the tribes "have a significant interest in
maintaining orderly relations among their members and in preserving tribal customs
and traditions .... " United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978).
44. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (1990).
45. The Court explained that had the Wheeler case involved a "manifestation of
external relations between the Tribe and outsiders, such power [of tribal prosecution]
would have been inconsistent with the Tribe's dependent status .. " Id
46. Id.
47. The Court cited Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), for the proposition
that states may not impose certain taxes on transactions of tribal members because to
do so would interfere with internal self-governance. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060. The
Court also cited Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980) to show that taxation on nonmembers does not interfere with internal
tribal governance. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060.
48. The Court stated that Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), held that
a tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on tribal land or trust land,
but the tribe could not regulate the same activities by nonmembers on land held by
nonmembers in fee. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
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and fishing regulation examples, the Court supported its argu-
ment that inherent tribal power does not extend to the activi-
ties of nonmembers.
After bolstering its argument, the Court addressed the
issue of tribal power over nonmembers in the civil law versus
criminal law context. The Court asserted that the tribes retain
greater power over nonmembers in civil matters, which usu-
ally arise with respect to property or consensual relationships,
while criminal matters involve a "far more direct intrusion
into personal liberties."'49 The Court concluded that, in the
criminal context, "tribal power does not extend beyond inter-
nal relations among members."'
Having argued that the exercise of tribal power over non-
members was inconsistent with the tribes' status as dependent
nations and having distinguished the broader exercise of tribal
power over nonmembers in the civil context, the Court
reviewed the historical definition of the word "Indian" in the
context of congressional and administrative provisions. The
Court rejected the argument that these provisions defined
"Indian" as a single broad class with respect to tribal power."'
In so doing, the Court reasoned that such definitions involved
the tribal relationship with the federal government and not
the tribal power to treat nonmembers and members equally.52
The Court further explained that the federal statutes merely
indicated a past Indian policy to treat Indians as one undiffer-
entiated group; this policy, the Court implied, was not determi-
native on the issue of tribal power over nonmember Indians.'
The Court also stated that the historical record showed little
federal attention to the power of an individual tribe, and thus,
the federal statutes could shed little, if any, light on the issue
of tribal power.'M Hence, the Court dismissed any federal pro-
visions defining the word "Indian" because the provisions
involved were focused on the tribal relationship with the fed-
eral government, indicated a past Indian policy, and revealed
little federal attention to the individual tribe's power.
49. Tribal courts have the power to resolve civil disputes arising on reservation
involving nonmembers as well as non-Indians. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2061. See also
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
50. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2061.
51. Id at 2062.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2062.
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After finding all congressional and administrative deci-
sions defining or discussing the term "Indian" useless in defin-
ing tribal power, the Court turned to the opinions of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to obtain "the most
specific historical evidence" on the issue of tribal power over
nonmembers.5 Although the Court cited five of these opin-
ions, it stressed only three.5 The Court indicated that one of
the Solicitor's opinions suggested that tribes could obtain juris-
diction over nonmembers by amending their tribal constitu-
tions or through a delegation of federal authority.57 A second
opinion mentioned adoption of nonmembers into the tribe, or,
again, delegation of federal authority.' The third and final
opinion relied upon by the Court indicated that the only way a
tribe could deal with "interloping" nonmember Indians was to
remove the nonmembers or to accept delegated authority.59
The Court argued that because these decisions "indicate
that the tribal courts embody only the powers of internal self-
governance," the decisions supported the conclusion that
inherent tribal power does not include criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians.' Thus, rather than relying on the
federal provisions defining the word "Indian," the Court
stressed the Solicitor's opinions regarding tribal power over
nonmember Indians.
The Court then asserted that the historical record must be
viewed under the shadow of Albert Duro's status as a citizen of
the United States.61 The Court argued that with the federal
grant of citizenship to all Indians in 1924 came protection from"unwarranted intrusions on [the Indians'] personal liberty."'62
An unwarranted intrusion on personal liberty included sub-
jecting a nonmember to trial and punishment by another
tribe.' The Court asserted that such a tribal exercise was an
55. Id. at 2063. The opinions of the Solicitor are the opinions of the "chief legal
officer" of the Department of the Interior, which is the federal administrative agency
managing Indian affairs. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't at v (introduction to administrative
compilation of Solicitor General opinions).
56. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (1990). The Court quickly dismissed
two of the opinions because the opinions broadly addressed jurisdiction over Indians in
general. Id.
57. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 736 (Mar. 17, 1937).
58. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 849 (Aug. 26, 1938).
59. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 872 (Feb. 17, 1939).
60. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (1990) (emphasis in original).
61. Id at 2063.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. The Court stated, "We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would
2391991]
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unwarranted intrusion because nonmembers had not con-
sented to be governed by other tribes 4 Hence, the Court indi-
cated that tribal assertion of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers was an unwarranted intrusion on the personal
liberty guaranteed to all United States citizens.
The Court also argued that Duro's status as an American
citizen invoked all the protections of citizenship.' The Court
asserted that because tribal governments need not apply full
Bill of Rights protections to defendants, citizenship protection
was missing in tribal courts.6 Again referring to the consent
argument, the Court reasoned that "the voluntary character of
tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation
in a tribal government" justified not applying the Bill of Rights
to members.6 7 Implicitly, however, the same logic did not
apply to nonmembers because they had not consented to be
governed by another tribe. Thus, allowing the tribal courts to
try nonmembers would subject American citizens to criminal
proceedings without constitutional guarantees.' In conclusion,
the Court argued that tribal assertion of criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers intruded upon the personal liberty guaran-
teed to all United States citizens and subjected American citi-
zens to criminal proceedings without constitutional guarantees.
The Court quickly dismissed two other arguments69 and
then confronted the jurisdictional gap problem that can arise
when nonmember Indians commit crimes on reservations.70 In
single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies
that do not include them." Id.
64. The Court propounded that in addition to the authority shared by the tribes
with the United States, the tribes possess additional authority through the consent of
its members, and this consent marks the bounds of tribal criminal authority. Duro v.
Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2064 (1990). By implication, because nonmembers do not
consent to be governed by other tribes, the tribes have no authority over them.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2064 (1990).
69. First, the Court dismissed the argument that Duro's status as a member of a
tribe indicated his self-identification as an Indian to be governed by another tribe. Id.
at 2064-65. The Court argued that the variations between tribes in "customs, art,
language, and physical characteristics" showed that Duro's status as an Indian
indicated little about his consent to be governed by another tribe. Id. at 2065. Second,
the Court dismissed a "contacts" test for nonmember Indians because nonmembers
share "jurisdictional characteristics" of non-Indians, and thus, nonmembers should
share the same jurisdictional status. Id.
70. The Court noted that the Oliphant Court rejected an argument that the
absence of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians would leave a jurisdictional void. Duro,
110 S. Ct. at 2065 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
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concluding that no jurisdiction gap existed, the Court made
three arguments. First, the Court suggested that the tribal
authorities could exclude trouble-makers, eject them, or detain
the offenders for the "proper authorities."'" The Court failed
to indicate who the "proper authorities" would be. Second, the
Court asserted that the states, with tribal consent, could assist
the tribes in maintaining order.72 The Court noted that Public
Law 280 provided the necessary mechanism for state assump-
tion of criminal jurisdiction.73 Third, the Court implied that
tribal governments may be able to enter into agreements that
give each tribe jurisdiction over the other's members.74 The
Court also intimated that if the current jurisdictional scheme
proved "insufficient," Congress could create a new one.75
Through these suggestions and arguments, the Court asserted
that no incurable jurisdictional gap problem would be created.
In summary, the substance of the Court's reasoning in
Dunr was relatively straightforward. The Court stated that,
under the Oliphant decision, Indian tribes are implicitly
divested of power that is inconsistent with their dependent sta-
tus. Next, the Court asserted that, under the Wheeler decision,
tribal attempts at regulating external relations are inconsistent
with the tribes' dependent status. Finally, the Court concluded
that tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is an external
relation and therefore inconsistent with the tribes' dependent
status.
The remainder of the opinion addressed Duro's arguments
and presented some alternative and rebuttal theories. First,
the Court turned to the historical record and dismissed any
federal provisions defining the word "Indian." Immediately
thereafter, the Court argued that the most illuminating histori-
cal evidence came from the opinions of the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior, and this evidence supported the
conclusion that inherent tribal power did not include criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Next, the Court argued
that Duro's status as a United States citizen afforded him pro-
tection from intrusion on his personal liberty that would occur
through the assertion of tribal criminal jurisdiction. The Court
also noted that tribal criminal jurisdiction would subject Duro,
71. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
72. Id. at 2066.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. I&
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as an American citizen, to proceedings without constitutional
guarantees. Finally, the Court insisted that no unresolvable
jurisdictional gap was created by holding that a tribal court
has no jurisdiction over nonmember Indians committing minor
crimes on reservation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DuRo
The Court's reasoning and arguments in Duro are flawed
in three areas: its examination of the historical record, its
emphasis upon Duro's United States citizenship status, and its
dismissal of the jurisdictional gap problem.
The Court's examination of the historical record is incom-
plete. Although the Court placed great emphasis on the
importance of the Oliphant decision, it did not fully consider
the court's reasoning in Oliphant. The Court dismissed the
relevance of federal statutes defining the word "Indian," thus
ignoring a significant source on the scope of tribal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. Finally, the Court misinterpreted
and ignored relevant opinions by the Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of the Interior.
The Court's reasoning is also flawed in the arguments it
espoused on the importance of Duro's status as a United States
citizen. By focusing on United States citizenship status for
Indians, the Court harkened back to an era when the Indian
tribes were losing power; this view runs completely counter to
the current congressional policy of expanding tribal power. In
addition, the Court's argument that one must consent to crimi-
nal jurisdiction conflicts with fundamental principles of
jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court's assertion that no jurisdiction gap
exists over nonmember Indians ignores the factual reality of
this case. The Court held that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over Albert Duro.7 6 Without tribal jurisdiction
over him and with the dismissal of the federal charges, Albert
Duro simply walked away. Moreover, the Court's solution to
this jurisdictional vacuum ultimately calls for Congress to cre-
ate a new jurisdictional framework, which would require Con-
gress to reshape its current policy of tribal self-determination.
76. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2061.
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A. The Historical Record
The first flaw in the Court's review of the historical record
is its limited consideration of Oliphant. Although the Court
began its argument by likening the Duro matter to Oliphant,"
it did not give the same credence to the historical record that
the Court did in Oliphant. To explain, although Oliphant par-
tially relied upon federal statutory history to conclude that the
tribes were implicitly divested of jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans,7 Duro dismissed these statutes as irrelevant on the issue
of jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 9 If the Court in
Duro had followed the lead of Oliphant and addressed this
statutory history, it would have found that the tribes had not
been implicitly divested of jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians.'
To recognize that the path of statutory analysis followed
by Oliphant would have produced a different result in Duro,
one must begin with the Trade and Intercourse Acts. Congress
adopted the first of these Acts in 1790.81 The 1790 Act pro-
vided for federal court punishment of non-Indians committing
criminal acts against "any peaceable and friendly Indian or
Indians" on Indian land. 2 Thus, the 1790 Act provided for fed-
77. The Court asserted that the issue in neither Duro nor Oliphant dealt with the
explicit divestiture of tribal power. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059. Rather, the issue in both
cases was whether the tribes implicitly lost their power through the tribes' dependent
status. Id.
78. In holding that tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders, the Court discussed statutory history; although such history was not
conclusive, the Court noted that the statutory indication of congressional presumption
carried "considerable weight." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206
(1978).
79. The Court dismissed the federal provisions because the provisions "reflect the
Government's treatment of Indians as a single large class with respect to federal
jurisdiction and programs. Those references are not dispositive of a question of tribal
power to treat Indians by the same broad classification." Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2062
(emphasis in original).
80. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2069 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
82. Id. Although the Act provided for the federal courts to hear the matter, the
state and territorial laws were to become the criminal code:
And it be further enacted, That if any citizen or inhabitant of the United
States, or of either of the territorial districts of the United States, shall go into
any town, settlement or territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians,
and shall there commit any crime upon, or trespass against, the person or
property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which, if committed
within the jurisdiction of any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the
said districts, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof, would be
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eral jurisdiction over non-Indian against Indian crime, but
made no mention of federal jurisdiction over Indian against
Indian crime.
Congress explicitly addressed jurisdiction over Indian
against Indian crime in the 1817 revision of the Trade and
Intercourse Act. 3 This revision provided that federal jurisdic-
tion would not extend to "any offense committed by one
Indian against another.""s  After succeeding revisions that
retained the "Indian against Indian" provision, the Trade and
Intercourse Acts became the existing Federal Enclaves Act."
Although these Acts merely facially define federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction, Oliphant's recognition of these Acts, versus
Duro's failure to recognize them, is important in two respects.
First, because congressional enactments can limit powers
retained by the tribes,"M federal statutes may be relevant to the
issue of the scope of tribal power.' Second, and more impor-
tant, the Trade and Intercourse Acts use the word "Indian" in
defining federal criminal jurisdiction. If the term "Indian"
includes both "member and nonmember," this strongly sug-
gests that the federal government recognizes Indians as but a
single class. If Indians are but a single class, then relations
among the individuals of that class are "internal" relations.
Under the Court's holding in Duro, tribes retain that degree of
sovereignty needed to control their internal relations."s Thus,
if "Indian" means "member and nonmember," the tribes do
not violate their dependent status by exercising criminal juris-
diction over nonmembers because such an exercise of jurisdic-
tion is necessarily included in the control of internal relations.
punishable by the laws of such state or district, such offender or offenders
shall be subject to the same punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the
same manner as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of
the state or district to which he or they may belong, against a citizen or white
inhabitant thereof.
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
83. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1817, 3 Stat. 383 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (1988)).
84. Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
86. "[S]pecific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments" limit the tribes'
retained powers. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
87. Indeed, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Duro, the Court in Oliphant
viewed the statutory history as evidence of a "commonly shared presumption" that the
tribes ceded their power over non-Indians to the federal government. Duro v. Reina,
110 S. Ct. 2053, 2069 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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This syllogism illustrates the importance of determining the
exact definition of the term "Indian."
Unfortunately, the Court's failure in Duro to address the
Trade and Intercourse Acts allowed it to avoid defining the
word "Indian" as used in federal statutes. As a result, the
Court never discovered the importance of the term "Indian."
By failing to define the term "Indian" as used in federal
statutes, the Duro Court summarily dismissed two relevant
cases. The first, United States v. Rogers, 9 involved the murder
of a white man by another white man on a Cherokee Indian
reservation.' The defendant claimed that he and the victim
had been adopted into the tribe.91 The applicable federal stat-
ute contained a provision asserting that the statute should "not
extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another."'  In ruling that the federal courts had
jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court explained that the
statutory language "does not speak of members of a tribe, but
of the race generally-of the family of Indians."'  This state-
ment indicates that the Supreme Court has defined the term
"Indians" to include member and nonmember Indians. Thus,
because all "Indians" are a single group, a tribe would be exer-
cising "internal relations"" by asserting criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians committing crimes on reservation.
This theory that criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is
part of the "internal relations" of a tribe is also supported by
the Court's holding in United States v. Kagama.95 In Kagama,
a member Hoopa Valley Indian murdered another member
Hoopa Valley Indian on the Hoopa Valley Reservation in Cali-
fornia.96 The Court held that under the Major Crimes Act, the
action fell under federal court jurisdiction.' In reaching its
89. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
90. Id. at 570.
91. Rogers claimed that he and the victim had voluntarily moved to Cherokee
Country without any intention of returning to the United States, incorporated
themselves into the tribe, gained tribal recognition as a tribal members, and resided on
the land. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 570-71.
92. 1d at 572. The applicable federal statute was the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
93. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
94. The Duro Court stated that "the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that
needed to control their own internal relations . Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053,
2060 (1990).
95. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
96. Id. at 376.
97. Id. at 385.
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conclusion, the Court explained that the effect of the Act, in
the context of an Indian against Indian murder, was "confined
to the acts of an Indian of some tribe... committed within the
limits of the reservation."" The Court reasoned that this
effect was within Congress' power because the tribes "are
wards of the nation," and the government has a duty to protect
them.99
Thus, the Court indicated that the membership status of
an Indian committing a major crime on reservation was irrele-
vant for federal jurisdiction purposes. Although the crime in
Kagama was a major crime, if membership status is irrelevant
for federal jurisdiction purposes, it should also be irrelevant
for tribal jurisdiction purposes because the federal duty to pro-
tect the tribes is best carried out by protecting tribal auton-
omy. In turn, tribal autonomy is best protected through the
tribal exercise of jurisdiction over crimes committed on reser-
vation by any Indian regardless of tribal affiliation.
Both of the above Court opinions support the thesis that
tribal courts should exercise jurisdiction over nonmember Indi-
ans committing minor crimes on reservation land. The Rogers
decision indicates that members and nonmembers fall under
the category of "internal relations," and the Kagama decision
implies that membership status should be irrelevant to tribal
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in deciding Duro, the Court curso-
rily dismissed cases defining or addressing the term "Indian."
Instead, the Court chose to rely upon the opinions of the Solici-
tor of the Department of the Interior to support the proposi-
tion that the tribes did not possess criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers. 1°0 In addition to being merely persuasive author-
ity upon the Supreme Court,"0l these opinions do not stand for
the proposition that the tribal courts possess no jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians.' 2
In Duro, the Court referred to five of the Solicitor's opin-
98. Id. at 383.
99. Id. at 383-84. Note that this duty of protection arose because of the tribes'
"weakness and helplessness." Id. at 384.
100. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (1990).
101. " he utility of the opinions in these volumes [of the solicitor's opinions] is not
that they have binding effect ...." I Op. Solic. Interior Dep't at v (introduction to
administrative compilation of Solicitor General opinions).
102. The Duro court stated that two of the opinions gave a "strong indication that
the... tribal courts were not understood to possess power over nonmembers." Duro,
110 S. Ct. at 2063.
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ions but stressed only three." 3 The first of these was an opin-
ion of March 17, 1937.104 This opinion dealt with law and order
ordinances adopted by the Tribal Council of the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai tribes.105 The opinion stated that the ordi-
nances defined "Indian" too broadly by including nonmem-
bers.'06 The opinion suggested that the tribes could assume
jurisdiction over nonmembers in two ways: amendment of the
tribal constitution or delegation of federal authority."° The
Court in Duro recognized this part of the Solicitor's opinion." 8
The Court failed to mention, however, the opinion's subse-
quent assertion that the only constraint upon the tribe's power
over nonmembers was its existing narrow tribal constitutional
authority."° Hence, by enlarging the tribe's power by amend-
ment of the tribal constitution, the tribe could obtain jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers." 0 As the Court itself recognized in
Duro, the option of amending the tribal constitution would"reflect a belief that tribes possess inherent sovereignty over
nonmembers."'111
The Court then turned to the Solicitor's opinions of
August 26, 1938 and February 17, 1939.12 Both of these opin-
ions dealt with the criminal jurisdiction of the Chippewa Cree
Tribe of the Rocky Boys Reservation in Montana; the latter
opinion also dealt with the Blackfeet Tribe in Montana." 3 As
the Court pointed out in Duro,"' these opinions suggested that
jurisdiction over nonmembers be federally delegated to the
tribes.115 However, the Court failed to cite another opinion
103. Id.
104. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 736 (Mar. 17, 1937).
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct 2053, 2063 (1990).
109. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 736 (Mar. 17, 1937).
110. Id
111. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063. The Court avoided reaching this conclusion in Duro
by asserting that the August 26, 1938 and February 17, 1939 Solicitor's opinions
indicated that the tribal courts "were not understood to possess power over
nonmembers." Id.
112. I&
113. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 849 (Aug. 26, 1938); 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 872
(Feb. 17, 1939).
114. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063.
115. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 849 (Aug. 26, 1938); 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 872
(Feb. 17, 1939). Contrary to the Court's assertion in Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063, however,
the February 17 opinion did not suggest the tribes could control Indians who are
members of other tribes by ejecting them from the reservation. Rather, the opinion
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that indicated that tribal power was not merely an exercise of
federally delegated authority.
In the opinion of October 25, 1938, the Solicitor explained
that the tribal law and order codes, developed by the tribes
themselves and applicable to members only, created a jurisdic-
tional gap over nonmembers." 6 Barring constitutional restric-
tions, which could be amended by the tribes themselves, 117 the
law and order codes could be amended by the tribes to include
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Thus, this opinion
implies that the tribes have the inherent power to obtain juris-
diction over nonmember Indians in criminal matters.
Moreover, if the Court was looking for a pronouncement
on whether tribal power was delegated to the tribes by the fed-
eral government, it needed to look no further than its own
decision in United States v. Wheeler."8  In examining the
source of tribal power in Wheeler, the Court concluded that
tribal power to punish crimes by tribe members was "attributa-
ble in no way to any delegation to [the tribes] of federal
authority."' 9 The Court reasoned that none of the federal acts
or treaties that it examined "created" the tribal power to gov-
ern its members.' Yet, the Court still held that the tribes
possessed the retained power to enforce tribal criminal laws
against their own members. 12 1
stated that the tribes could control only "member of no tribe" Indians by removing
them from the reservation. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 872 (Feb. 17, 1939). Thus, this
assertion is irrelevant on the subject of tribal power over nonmember Indians who are
members of other tribes because Indians who are members of no tribe have distanced
themselves from the tribe whereas those who are tribal members have embraced their
Indian heritage, at least to some degree. By virtue of this distancing, Indians who
belong to no tribe should be treated jurisdictionally just as non-Indians.
The distinction between tribal members and nonmembers is important in Duro
because Duro is an enrolled member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2056.
116. 1 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 859 (Oct. 25, 1938).
117. The March Solicitor's opinion, I Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 736 (Mar. 17, 1937),
suggested amendment of the tribal constitution as an option for obtaining tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers.
118. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
119. Id. at 328.
120. The Court addressed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. 987
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476), the Act of Apr. 19, 1950, § 6, 64 Stat. 46 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 636), and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302). United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327-28 (1978).
Discussion of the relevance of treaties to tribal power has been omitted in light of
the Court's comment in Duro that scholars are divided in their opinions over treaty
evidence. Dturo, 110 S. Ct. at 2062.
121. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
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Although Wheeler involved tribal jurisdiction over mem-
ber Indians, the Court's reasoning is also applicable to the issue
of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Simply put, no federal
statute delegates federal authority to the tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over nonmembers. As the court explained in
Wheeler, the absence of such a statute implies that exercise of
such jurisdiction is an exercise of the tribes' retained
sovereignty.
The Court's incomplete analysis of the opinions of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior allowed it to reach
a different conclusion than that for which the opinions stand.
Indeed, both the March 1937 opinion cited by the Court and
the October 1938 opinion omitted by the Court indicate that
the tribes possess inherent power over nonmembers. The opin-
ions relied upon by the Court to illuminate the historical rec-
ord thus actually represent only part of the Solicitor's theory
of tribal power and are ambiguous at best. Additionally, an
explanation of whether tribal power over nonmembers was
federally delegated to the tribes can be found in Wheeler. The
Wheeler opinion, as Supreme Court precedent, is the authori-
tative source on the matter of tribal power, and it provides the
framework for concluding that such power was not delegated
to the tribes by the federal government.
A recent congressional act that amends the definition of"powers of self-government" and adds a new definition of
"Indian' 2 2 also sheds light upon the tribal power to exercise
jurisdiction over nonmembers. A provision buried in the
Defense Appropriations Act for 1991 states that "powers of
self-government" mean the "inherent power of Indian tribes
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."'" s"Indian" is defined as "any person who would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under [the Major
Crimes Act] if that person were to commit an offense ... in
Indian country."'124 The Major Crimes Act, of course, extends
federal jurisdiction to major crimes committed by any Indian,
member or nonmember, on reservation land.2's The Defense
Appropriations Act, made permanent by Congress in 1991,
indicates Congress' intent that the tribes exercise criminal
122. Defense Appropriations Act for 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), (c), 104
Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301).
123. Id. at § 8077(b), 104 Stat. at 1892.
124. Id. at § 8077(c), 104 Stat. at 1892-93.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
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jurisdiction over member and nonmember Indians committing
minor crimes on reservation. 26 Furthermore, although this act
was unavailable to the Court at the time of Duro, given the
Court's apparent inattention to congressional pronouncements
on the scope of tribal power, one wonders whether the Court
would have found it determinative in defining tribal
jurisdiction.
The Court's analysis of the historical record leaves one
wanting more. Although the Court starts with the Oliphant
approach that the tribes can be implicitly divested of their
power, the Court fails to follow through with an analysis of the
relevant federal statutes that would help define jurisdiction.
Had the Court undertaken this analysis, it would have found
that early in its history the Supreme Court was predisposed to
treat member and nonmember Indians as a single broad class.
The tribal regulation of this single broad class, through the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, is an "internal relation" that
does not conflict with the tribes' dependent status. Despite the
Court's assertion to the contrary, this conclusion is not under-
mined by the decisions of the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior. Indeed, the decisions actually substantiate the
theory that the tribes possess inherent power over nonmember
Indians. Additionally, as recently as 1991, Congress has indi-
cated its desire that the tribes retain jurisdiction over non-
members committing minor crimes on reservations.
B. Indian Citizenship
Having swept aside and misinterpreted much of the histor-
ical record, the Court argued that the importance of Albert
Duro's status as a United States citizen mandated the result
that tribes do not have jurisdiction over minor crimes commit-
ted on reservation by nonmembers.'" This citizenship status
argument is unsatisfying first because Indian citizenship
became a reality during an era of diminishing tribal power and,
second, because one need not consent to be amenable to crimi-
nal jurisdiction.
126. As of October 28, 1991, Congress made permanent the Defense
Appropriations Act provision stating that the tribes possess inherent criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians. Pub. L. No. 102-1037, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (1991). The act did
not pass without resistance. David Schaefer, Gorton Wages Familiar Fight Against
Tribal Court Power, SEArLE TIMES/SEArrLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 29, 1991, at
127. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063-65 (1990).
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Indian citizenship became an issue for Indian reformers's
following the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Ex
Parte Crow Dog.' The reformers made some progress
towards gaining citizenship for the Indians with the General
Allotment Act, or the Dawes Act, of 1887."3 The Dawes Act
was a congressional effort to allot specific parcels of tribal land
to the head of each Indian family.131 Upon receiving an allot-
ment in fee simple, the Indian became a United States citi-
zen. 3 2 The reformers' dream of Indian citizenship did not end
with the Dawes Act, however; it continued into the turn of the
century, and in 1901 Congress made every Indian in the Indian
Territory a citizen of the United States.133 Subsequently in
1924, Congress granted citizenship to all Indians born within
the boundaries of the United States through the Indian Citi-
zenship Act.134 The effort to make the Indians United States
citizens thus spanned the history of the allotment era.1" The
significance of this trend is that the allotment era was a time
of assimilating the tribes into European culture and removing
their power. 136 Thus, the period during which Indians gained
128. "To make the Indians into acceptable American citizens was the great goal of
the humanitarian reformers and of the Indian Office." FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE
GREAT FATHER 230 (1984).
129. In Crow Dog, the Court held that the federal government had no jurisdiction
over major crimes committed by one Indian against another. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883). The decision prompted Congress to pass the Major Crimes Act, now
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), which essentially negated the Crow Dog decision
and substantially limited tribal power. See aupra note 13.
130. See PRUCHA, supra note 128, at 232, for a discussion of the General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988)).
131. See PRUCHA, supra note 128, at 226. Although the original Dawes Act allotted
160 acres of tribal land to heads of households and 40 acres of tribal land to minors, ch.
119, § 1, 24 Stat. 38 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)), an 1891 amendment
allotted 80 acres of agricultural land or 160 acres of grazing land to each tribal
member. Dawes Act of February 28, 1891, ch. 383, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 794 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
The United States was to hold the land in trust for 25 years. Ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat.
388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988)). However, in 1906, the Burke Act
allowed the federal government to transfer fee patents to "competent" Indians. Ch.
2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). A devastating loss of
Indian land followed as Indians sold and lost their land. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 20.
132. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 20.
133. PRUCHA, supra note 128, at 260 (discussing the Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 119,
31 Stat. 1447).
134. Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1988)).
135. The "Allotment and Assimilation" era of Indian history ran from 1887 to
1934. WuAM" C. CANBY, JR., AMERIcAN INDIAN LAw 19 (1988).
136. Indeed, in 1914, after the allotment of the lands of the Cherokee Nation,
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citizenship, from 1887 to 1924, was not a time of expanding tri-
bal power. By making a citizenship argument, the Court in
Duro harkens back to a distant era of limited tribal power.
The current status of congressional Indian policy is vastly
different. The current policy is codified as the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Act.137 This Act declares Con-
gress' continuing commitment to maintaining the tribes'
"unique" relationship with the federal government and pro-
moting the establishment of the "meaningful participation" of
the Indians in federal programs.1" In 1988, Congress amended
the Act to declare that "the United States is committed to sup-
porting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of
strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering
quality programs. . .. "139 Thus, Congress' current policy pro-
motes tribal self-government.
The contrast between the allotment era and the current
self-determination era is striking. By propounding the virtues
of Indian citizenship in Duro, the Court effectively steps back
to an era when congressional policy was to eliminate Indian
power. This step back cuts against current Indian policy
because current policy is to allow the tribes a high degree of
self-government. A high degree of self-government is main-
tained through the tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers because the tribes exert power over Indian peo-
ple, as a single broad class, under tribally developed law. Thus,
the Court's citizenship argument, although patriotically appeal-
ing in a sense, throws Indian policy backwards over 100 years.
In addition to the error of turning for support to a time of
diminishing tribal power, the Court erred in its assertion that
subjecting nonmember Indians to trial by another tribe was an
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane declared that the demise of the tribe
"arouses dreams of the day when the Indian shall be wholly blended into our
[European-style] life .... " PRuCHA, supra note 128, at 306.
Professor Wilkinson commented that "[a]llotment and the other assimilationist
programs that complemented it devastated the Indian land base, weakened Indian
culture, sapped the vitality of tribal legislative and judicial processes, and opened most
Indian reservations for settlement by non-Indians." Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 19.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988). President Richard M. Nixon first spoke of the federal
policy of Indian self-determination in 1970 when he posited that "it should be up to the
Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing to assume administrative responsibility
for a service program which is presently administered by a Federal agency." 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2620, 2622. President Gerald Ford signed into law the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act on January 4, 1975. 1a at 2620.
138. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (1988).
139. I&
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unwarranted intrusion on the personal liberty guaranteed to
all United States citizens.14 The fallacy in this assertion
results from the implied premise that nonmembers must con-
sent to be governed by other tribes to be amenable to criminal
jurisdiction. 141 As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,
the Court has never held that participation in the political pro-
cess is a prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
a sovereign."4 Justice Brennan wrote: "If such were the case,
a State could not prosecute nonresidents, and this country
could not prosecute aliens who violate our laws."'" Further-
more, even if one had to consent to be amenable to tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction, nonmembers have consented to tribal
jurisdiction merely by committing a crime on the reserva-
tion.144 Thus, the consent theory espoused by the Court in
Duro ignores basic principles of criminal jurisdiction.'"
Overall, the Court's citizenship argument fails. First, the
theory of protecting the status of Indians as United States citi-
zens flies in the face of the current congressional policy to
allow Indians a high degree of self-government. Second, the
consent argument conflicts with fundamental legal principles
of criminal jurisdiction.
C. The Jurisdictional Gap
After rebutting and asserting historical and citizenship
arguments, the Court addressed the issue of a jurisdictional
gap over nonmember Indians committing minor crimes on res-
ervation.x ' The Court essentially offered three arguments to
prove that no jurisdiction gap problem existed; it also offered a
possible solution should a jurisdictional gap problem appear. 147
The Court first argued that the tribal authorities could
exclude the nonmember offenders, eject them, or detain them
140. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063-64 (1990).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. 1d
144. Justice Brennan asserted that "It]he commission of a crime is all the 'consent'
that is necessary to allow the tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction" over nonmember
Indians. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2071 (1990).
145. For an argument that the Court should have implemented an implied consent
theory to allow tribal courts to obtain jurisdiction, see Peter Fabish, Note, The Decline
of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey from Dicta to Dogma in Duro v. Reina, 66 WAsH.
L. REV. 567 (1991).
146. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
147. Id.
1991]
254 University of Puget Sound Law Review
for "the proper authorities."'14 The powers to exclude or eject
offenders are related and are fully possessed by the tribes. 49
However, the powers of exclusion and ejection allow the tribes
to do no more than to keep people off of reservation land.
These powers do not include the power to punish criminal
offenders with fines or jail time. Thus, exclusion and ejection
do not equal the power of traditional criminal jurisdiction and
do not support the conclusion that a jurisdictional gap over
nonmembers does not exist.
The Court's other notion was that, if jurisdiction to punish
lies outside the tribe, the tribal authorities could detain the
offender for the "proper authorities."'" Under existing statu-
tory and case law, neither the federal government nor those
state governments that have declined to exercise Public Law
280 jurisdiction are the "proper authority" because neither can
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against
Indians on reservation land.151 The "detain" argument thus
fails to support the Court's argument that no jurisdiction gap
exists. Rather, because there are no "proper authorities," this
argument actually supports the contrary conclusion that a gap
does indeed exist.
The Court's second jurisdictional gap argument asserted
that the states, with tribal consent, could assume jurisdiction
over nonmembers committing crimes on reservation via Public
Law 280.152 This argument is flawed because the Court does
not indicate which entity would exercise jurisdiction if states
do not adopt Public Law 280; simply proposing that the states
assume jurisdiction begs the question of whether at present an
underlying jurisdiction gap problem exists. The Public Law
280 argument is also flawed because it asks the states to adopt
a policy of tribal assimilation." 3 This assimilation policy, how-
148. Id. at 2066.
149. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), the Court asserted
that "[n]onmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe's
power to exclude them." Id. at 144 (emphasis in original). The power of exclusion
includes the corollary power of ejection. Id. (Court speaks of the tribes' "ultimate
power to oust"). Exclusion and ejection are "sovereign" powers. Id. at 145.
150. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2066 (1990).
151. The Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988), exempts from federal
jurisdiction "Indian against Indian" crimes occurring on reservation, and the
McBratney and Draper decisions allow for state criminal jurisdiction over only non-
Indian against non-Indian crimes committed on reservation. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
152. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066.
153. Congress enacted Public Law 280 during the "termination" era of Indian
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ever, has given way to the current policy of tribal self-govern-
ance.154 Thus, the Public Law 280 argument ignores the issue
of whether a jurisdictional gap exists and asks the states to
execute a policy that clashes with current federal policy.
The Court also implied that no jurisdictional gap exists
because the tribes could possibly enter into intertribal agree-
ments to assume jurisdiction over each other's members who
are criminal offenders."5 Had the court examined the inter-
tribal agreement theory it would have found two basic
problems: The theory provides for a potentially confusing
jurisdictional patchwork over nonmembers, and if the inter-
tribal agreements become widespread, the theory undermines
the Duro holding that the tribes have no jurisdiction over non-
members committing minor crimes in Indian Country.
As to the first of these problems, formation of jurisdic-
tional agreements between the numerous scattered tribes"
would result in a jurisdictional quagmire. For instance, the
Ute tribe in New Mexico may have jurisdiction over members
of the Taos and Picuris Reservations committing minor crimes
but not over members of the Mescalero or Sandia Reservations
committing the same crimes. This inconsistency simply creates
unnecessary headaches for the tribal officers and judges trying
to sort out the tribal affiliations of accused nonmembers before
proceeding with, or dismissing, their cases. The Court offers
no justification for adding confusion to the already confused
jurisdictional framework now in place.
In addition, the intertribal agreement theory potentially
undermines the result in Duro that the tribes possess no juris-
diction over nonmember offenders. Although the agreements
would not represent an exercise of the tribes' inherent jurisdic-
tional power, the proliferation of jurisdictional agreements
could place jurisdiction, in a practical sense, squarely with the
tribes. Such an outcome would strip the Duro decision of all
practical meaning.
Finally, the Court indicated that Congress could create a
history. The termination policy "envisioned the complete assimilation of Indian
reservations into the states." Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 951, 969
(1975).
154. See the Indian Self-Determination Act, 25U.S.C. § 450 (1988).
155. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2066 (1990).
156. There are at least 481 federally recognized Indian tribes in some 38 states. D.
GETCHES ET Al, FEDERAL INDiAN LAw 2-3, 5 (1979).
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new jurisdictional scheme should the current jurisdictional
scheme prove insufficient.157  This extreme solution to the
jurisdictional gap problem asks Congress to do that which it
should not have to do. Indeed, Congress has already made
clear its policy to grant the tribes a high degree of self-govern-
ment.158 Had the Court in Duro taken into account current
congressional policy, it would not have proposed that Congress
make any additional clarifications or changes.
Thus, by concluding that no jurisdiction gap exists, the
Court demonstrates its fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of a jurisdictional void and ignores current federal
Indian policy. The Court's solution to the jurisdictional gap
problem asks Congress to clarify or change a policy that Con-
gress has already clearly set forth.
In summary, the Court's decision in Duro was flawed in
three areas. First, the Court incompletely analyzed the histori-
cal record by ignoring relevant federal statutes and judicial
decisions illuminating criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indian offenders. Next, the Court espoused the virtues of
United States citizenship status for Indians, ignoring the cur-
rent congressional policy of expansive tribal power. Finally,
the Court wrongly insisted that no jurisdictional gap problem
existed but that if there were a problem, Congress was the
appropriate body to remedy the problem.
V. THE FUTURE OF JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBER
AGAINST INDIAN MINOR CRIME
The Duro decision renders academic any discussion of how
the Court should have made its decision and by what measure
it should have allowed the tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians, at least until the Court reconsiders its
decision. Hence, after the Court's holding in Duro, the ques-
tion becomes whether the states or the federal government
will exercise jurisdiction over crimes other than major non-
member crimes committed on reservation lands. An indication
of which entity may exercise jurisdiction may be gleaned by re-
examining the existing status of federal and state jurisdiction
over Indian against Indian crimes occurring on reservation
land.
Federal jurisdiction over these crimes is currently statuto-
157. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066.
158. See the Indian Self Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988).
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rily impossible. A Federal Enclaves Act provision exempts
from federal jurisdiction other than major "Indian against
Indian" crimes occurring on reservation. 59 In addition, Con-
gress will probably not amend the Act or otherwise allow for
federal jurisdiction of minor criminal offenses because the fed-
eral authorities are loathe to prosecute minor crime cases that
would overload the already congested federal dockets, involve
burdensome travel, and result in only low fines or suspended
sentences."8 Furthermore, Congress has expressed its desire,
through the Indian Self Determination Act, that the tribes
retain a high degree of self-government.161 Passing a new law
mandating federal jurisdiction over nonmember Indian crimes
would strike at the self determination policy that Congress has
so recently put into place. The existence of the Federal
Enclaves Act and the slim possibility of the Act's revision
imply that the federal government will not assume jurisdiction
over minor crimes committed on reservation by nonmember
Indians against other Indians. Furthermore, although Con-
gress indicated its intent that the tribes exercise jurisdiction
over nonmember offenders," 2 it remains to be seen if this leg-
islative pronouncement will withstand judicial scrutiny.
Second, just as Congress is unlikely to assume jurisdiction
over minor nonmember crimes committed on reservation, the
states probably will not assume jurisdiction over these crimes.
Although Congress gave the states the opportunity to adopt
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, some of the states that
assumed jurisdiction under this statute have ceded the power
back to the federal government. 6 3 Perhaps the cost of extra
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
160. Steven M. Johnson, Note, Jurisdiction: Criminal Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake of Oliphant, 7 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 291, 298 (1978); see also Patricia Owen, Note, Who is an Indian?: Duro v.
Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty and Criminal Jurisdiction over
Nonmember Indians, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 161, 174 (1988). Both of these commentators
assert that minor crimes committed on reservations are unlikely to interest federal
prosecutors.
161. See 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988).
162. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
163. 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) authorizes the United States to accept a retrocession of
criminal or civil jurisdiction first assumed mandatorily or optionally by any state
under Public Law 280.
The Washington legislature ceded criminal jurisdiction back to the United States
over the Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish, and Colville reservations as well as over
"lands excluded from Olympic National Park." See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 37.12.100-
.150 (1989). The Governor of Washington also ceded jurisdiction over the Suquamish
Port Madison Indian Reservation and the Quinault Indian Reservation back to the
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police patrols on reservation land stretched the taxpayers'
patience and the states' coffers.1' 4 Regardless, only nine states
have ever assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction. The state ret-
rocession of Public Law 280 jurisdiction and the low number of
states assuming Public Law 280 jurisdiction indicate that the
states will not assume jurisdiction over minor nonmember
crimes.
Thus, the jurisdictional gap over nonmember Indians,
which the Court in Duro claimed did not exist, is all too real.
Moreover, because of the existing federal and state jurisdic-
tional situation, the gap will not soon be filled.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Duro v. Reina answers in
the negative the question of whether the tribes have jurisdic-
tion over minor Indian against Indian crime committed on res-
ervation. However, the Court leaves open the question of
which governing entity, federal or state, will exercise jurisdic-
tion over this class of criminal offenses.
In reaching its decision, much of the Court's logic is
flawed. First, the Court's analysis of the historical record is
incomplete. Although the Court starts with the Oliphant
approach that the tribes can be implicitly divested of their
power, the Court fails to follow through with an analysis of the
relevant federal statutes that would help in defining jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the Court fails to give deference to the complete
historical record.
Furthermore, the Court's citizenship argument fails. The
theory of protecting the status of Indians as United States citi-
zens ignores the current congressional policy that the tribes be
allowed a high degree of self-government. Further, the argu-
ment fails to take into account the basic principle of consent to
criminal jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court's argument that no jurisdictional gap
United States. COHEN, supra note 13, at 370 n.195. Wisconsin, Nevada, Minnesota, and
Nebraska also ceded at least some part of their Public Law 280 jurisdiction back to the
United States. Id.
164. Immediately following the enactment of Public Law 280 in its original form,
one commentator asserted that few states would extend their criminal jurisdiction via
Public Law 280 "because this law does not authorize any corresponding extension of
the taxing power of the state to recoup the added cost of law enforcement." Laurence
Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Country in Arizona, 1 ARiz. L. REV. 62, 89
(1959).
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exists begs the fundamental question. The Court's arguments
ignore the existence of a gap and posit jurisdiction where there
is none. The Court also ignores the current federal Indian pol-
icy of expansive tribal self-governance by asking the states to
assume jurisdiction over tribal lands. The Court's solution to
an insufficient jurisdictional scheme is to ask Congress to cre-
ate a new jurisdictional framework. This solution is unneces-
sary given Congress' clearly stated policy of tribal self-
governance.
The Court's decision also leaves open the possibility that a
jurisdictional void will be unfilled by either the federal or the
state governments. The prosecution of additional minor crimi-
nal offenses simply poses financial and practical burdens that
may be too heavy for the federal and state governments.
A more efficient and sound approach for the Court would
have been simply to allow the tribes to exercise their inherent
sovereignty over nonmember criminal offenders. Instead,
what remains after Duro is judicially pared down tribal sover-
eignty and a gap over crimes committed on reservation by non-
member Indians.
1991:]
